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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
—0000O0000—

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 950654-CA

KENNETH FOX
Defendant/Appellant.
—0000O0000—

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction over appeals from Circuit Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(d)(1990).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The applicable statute to this appeal is Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953, as
amended), and is attached hereto as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Has defendant waived his claim that the state failed to establish

reasonable suspicion for stopping him because the officer did not testify at the hearing?
2.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion on the basis that the

informant was reliable and provided the police with reasonable suspicion to justify
stopping defendant?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial courts factual finding for a motion to suppress should not be upset on
appeal unless clearly erroneous. State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). Factual findings are not clearly erroneous unless they "are against the clear
weight of evidence, or [unless] the appellate curt otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. Rulings on issues of law are reviewed
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under a "correction of error" standard. City of Monticello v, Christensen, 788 P.2d
518 (Utah) cert, denied, 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol on January 7,
1995. He later filed a motion to suppress the evidence of his intoxication on the basis
that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him.
An evidentiary hearing on the motion was held on May 23, 1995, before the
Honorable Cornaby. After hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, the court
denied the motion, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the informant
was reliable and provided the officer with enough information to create reasonable
suspicion to justify stopping defendant.
Defendant was later convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol after a
bench trial before the Honorable Michael K. Burton on September 12, 1995.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The last thing George Cassity wanted to happen after a long, hard day at work
was to run into his ex-wife's boyfriend, the defendant, at midnight on January 6, 1995
(Trial Transcript at 12 (hereinafter "T"). But there are some things in life you cannot
control. After Mr. Cassity and his wife parked their car to have dinner at the New
Yorker Restaurant, they saw defendant walking arm in arm with a women as they left
the restaurant (T. 13). Mr. Cassity could also see that defendant was having difficulty
walking to his car parked along Market Street (T. 28).
After getting into his eggshell colored 1990 Nissan 300ZX, defendant raced
away with his female companion, driving down the middle of the road

(T. 15-16).

Curious as to what defendant was doing with another women, Mr. Cassity decided to
follow (T. 17). Defendant quickly turned south on West Temple and raced through the
500 South intersection, going 40 miles an hour. (T. 17). When he got to 600 South, a
one way street for eastbound traffic, defendant turned west into four lanes of oncoming
2

traffic (T. 18). As he made this dangerous turn, defendant roared around the corner at
a high speed and had to swerve into the Embassy Suites Hotel to avoid a head-on
collision (T. 18).

Upon seeing this, Mr. Cassity screamed: "we've got a head-on

collision here." (T. 18).

Within a minute or two, defendant shot out of the hotel

underground parking lot and headed south again on West Temple, this time at 60 miles
an hour. (T. 19). At this point, Mr. Cassity's blood was boiling and knew defendant was
a serious danger to himself and others. (T. 18). He continued to follow and called 911,
but could not find any help (T. 20). Mr. Cassity had great difficulty keeping up because
of defendant's excessive speed, and lost defendant at times (T. 19).
But Mr. Cassity was able to catch up after defendant stopped at a country bar at
3900 South and Main Street to drop off his female companion (T. 20-21). Defendant
then left the bar going south at 50 to 60 miles an hour (T. 21). Feeling he had had
enough and wanted to go eat, Mr. Cassity decided not to continue to follow the
defendant (T. 22). But as luck would have it, Mr. Cassity's wife spotted two Salt Lake
City police officers parked nearby (T. 22, 29).
In an effort to fulfill his civic duty, Mr. Cassity stopped and told the officers about
defendant's dangerous driving and his obvious impairment (T. 22, 27-28). He gave the
officers a description of defendant's car and his direction of travel (T. 31). Without a
moment to spare, Officer Schow "took off' after defendant (T. 28). While Mr. Cassity
did not give the police his correct name or address, he did give his correct mobile
telephone number (T. 22-23). Mr. Cassity was fearful that if defendant knew who had
reported him to the police, defendant would retaliate against him and his children, who
lived with their mother (T. 25-26).
Shortly after speaking with Mr. Cassity, Officer Schow found and pulled
defendant over at 4500 South and 350 West (T. 34-35). The officer then called the
Utah Highway Patrol and requested a trooper to come and investigate the defendant for
driving under the influence of alcohol (T. 34).
3

Trooper McMorris responded and met the defendant and the two Salt Lake City
police officers, one of which was Officer Schow (T. 36). The trooper subsequently
arrested defendant for driving while intoxicated.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant has failed to preserve the issue of whether Officer Schow was
required to testify at the motion hearing for the state to establish reasonable suspicion
for the stop. He agreed prior to the hearing that the officer need not testify and failed to
raise the issue during argument. Thus, this court should refuse to consider this issue
on appeal.
Even if defendant preserved this issue for appeal, the trial court properly denied
defendant's motion to suppress.

The state successfully established reasonable

suspicion for the stop through Mr. Cassity's testimony, which testimony provided the
objective facts to justify the stop.

Officer Schow's testimony was not necessary

because the stop was based solely upon what Mr. Cassity told him about defendant's
criminal behavior.
Furthermore, Officer Schow justifiably relied upon Mr. Cassity's tip as the basis
for stopping defendant; Mr. Cassity was a sufficiently reliable informant under the
totality of the circumstances. Therefore, this court should affirm the lower court's denial
of defendant's motion to suppress.

4

ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HIS CLAIM THAT THE STATE FAILED TO
DEMONSTRATE REASONABLE SUSPICION BECAUSE OFFICER SCHOW
FAILED TO TESTIFY AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING.
Defendant has waived his claim that Officer Schow was required to testify at the

hearing for the state to establish reasonable suspicion for two reasons. First, defendant
agreed that the officer's presence was not required. Second, he failed to raise the
issue during argument on the motion.
A.

Defendant Agreed Officer Schow's Presence at the Hearing was
Unnecessary.

It is black-letter law that if a defendant expressly withdraws or abandons an
objection to an issue at the trial court level, he has waived that issue and is precluded
from raising it on appeal. State v. Castro, 788 P.2d 1216, reconsideration denied,
review denied, (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Shelton v. State, 546 P.2d 1348 (Okl. Crim. App.
1976); People v. Calliham, 185 P.2d 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947).
At the beginning of the hearing, the state, because the officer had failed to
appear, raised the issue of whether defendant would claim Officer Schow's testimony
was required to show reasonable suspicion (T. 3-5). After a brief colloquy among the
court, prosecutor and defense counsel, defendant agreed to proceed without the officer
(T. 5-7).
Because defendant openly agreed on the record that Officer Schow's presence
was not needed for the hearing, he has waived the claim that the trial erred in finding
reasonable suspicion for stopping defendant without the officer's testimony. Any other
result would reward defendant for misleading the state and unfairly prejudice the state
because it is now precluded from calling Officer Schow to remedy the deficiency the
defendant now claims - but the defendant knows this. If anyone should be penalized
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at this stage, it would be the defendant. While he might now be unhappy with his
decision to proceed without the officer, it is not a basis for an appeal.
B.

Defendant also Failed to Raise the Issue of the Officer's Presence During
Argument.

Not only did defendant agree Officer Schow's testimony was not required - he
also failed to raise the issue in his argument. The law is clear that if an appellant fails
to properly preserve an issue for appeal, he has waived that issue. State v. Brown,
865 P.2d 358, 359 N. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The burden rests on the party raising the
issue on appeal to take those steps necessary to preserve the issue of appellate review
and determination. Id, Broberg v. Hess, 782 P. 2d 198, 210 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Appellate courts will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Ong Int'l
(U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P. 2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993). Arguments not
raised at the trial level cannot be offered for the first time on appeal.

People v.

Gordon, 792 P.2d 251 (Cal. 1990); Whittingham v. Bray, 613 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1980).
After agreeing to go forward with the hearing, defendant stated that he may raise
the issue of Officer Schow's absence later in the hearing (T. 5). However, at no time
did defendant raise the issue again. He never argued that the state had failed to
establish reasonable suspicion because the officer had failed to testify.

In fact, his

argument focused entirely upon whether Mr. Cassity was a reliable informant.
The truth of the matter is that defendant did not have a problem with Officer
Schow's absence from the hearing; he has a problem with the court disagreeing with
his claim about Mr. Cassity's reliability. Defendant thought that the officer's absence
would work to his benefit, but that strategy backfired. A failed trial strategy is not a
proper basis for appeal.
Because defendant failed to argue this issue, he failed to properly preserve it;
therefore, he has waived it.
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II.

TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE OF HIS INTOXICATION.
In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court ruled properly.

Mr.

Cassity not only provided Officer Schow with objective facts creating reasonable
suspicion defendant was committing a crime, but he also was a sufficiently reliable
informant under the totality of the circumstances.
A.

Reasonable Suspicion that Defendant was Committing a Crime was
Based upon Objective Facts.

In Utah, a level two stop requires a "reasonable articulate suspicion" that
defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime. Men/re, 787 P.2d at 541. In
order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry, it must be determined if, from the facts
apparent to the officer and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that officer
would reasonably suspect that defendant was driving while intoxicated. State v. Baird,
7638 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). This suspicion must be based on
"'objective facts' that the individual is involved in criminal activity.'" State v. Holmes,
744 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(quoting State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718,
719 (Utah 1985)). "Whether there are objective facts to justify such a stop depends on
the 'totality of the circumstances."' Id. (quoting State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183
(Utah 1987)).
In this case, Mr. Cassity testified that he told Officer Schow everything that
happened, including the fact that he had followed defendant from the New Yorker to
3900 South and Main; defendant went the wrong way on a one-way street and had
swerved into Embassy Suites to avoid a head-on accident; defendant raced down West
Temple at excessive speeds; and defendant was obviously impaired (T. 22, 27-28). He
also gave the officers the defendant's name and a description of his car (T. 31).
Shortly after speaking with Mr. Cassity, the officer stopped defendant at 4500
South and 350 West - about eight blocks from where Mr. Cassity last saw defendant.
The officer then called Highway Patrol to investigate defendant for drunken driving.
7

Based upon this detailed description of defendant's driving pattern, a driving
pattern indicative of a drunk driver, the officer's stop of defendant was based upon
objective facts that would have lead a reasonable and prudent police officer to believe
that defendant was committing a crime. Therefore, the stop was proper.
Assuming the defendant has preserved the issue that the state failed to establish
reasonable suspicion because Officer Schow failed to testify, such testimony was not
necessary.

It was Mr. Cassity, the informant, who provided the trial court with the

objective facts to sustain the stop. The test is what a reasonable and prudent officer
would have done under similar circumstances. Mr. Cassity's testimony answered that
question because he, and only he, witnessed defendant's criminal behavior, not the
officer.

What Officer Schow knew about defendant came directly from Mr. Cassity.

Defendant's argument would have merit if the state had relied at the hearing upon facts
Officer Schow had developed from his own observations of defendant to justify the
stop. However, the state made no such claim.
Furthermore, defendant has cited no authority to support his claim that a witness
like Mr. Cassity cannot exclusively provide the evidence at a suppression hearing to
establish reasonable cause under circumstances similar to this case, particularly when
the standard is an objective, not subjective test.
The fact that the officer's testimony was not necessary is bolstered by the
undisputed sequence of events that occurred in this case as established at the hearing.
Mr. Cassity observed defendant's erratic driving, he told the police about it and they
stopped the defendant. All of this happened within a short distance and short period of
time. Based upon this uninterrupted chain of events, the only logical inference that can
be reached is that Officer Schow stopped defendant only because of what Mr. Cassity
told him about defendant's crime. The officer's testimony would have simply mirrored
Mr. Cassity's.

Moreover, why was Officer Schow's testimony needed when all the

parties agreed that he stopped defendant because of what Mr. Cassity told him?
8

B.

George Cassity was a Reliable Informant upon Which an
Officer Could Properly Rely Under the Totality of the Circumstances.

The law is well settled that reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop may be
based upon an informant's tip provided it is sufficiently reliable. Alabama v. White, 110
S.Ct. 2412 (1990); Adams v. Williams, 92 S.Ct. 1921 (1972). Whether an informant's
tip is sufficiently reliable is analyzed under a "totality of the circumstances" test, where
the informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are highly relevant. Illinois
v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
One of those circumstances depends upon the extent of the police intrusion. As
the Court in White stated:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than
probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable
suspicion can be established with information that is different
in quantity or content than that required to establish probable
cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can
arise from information that is less reliable than that required to
show probable cause, (emphasis added).
110 S.Ct. at 2416.
Another circumstance is the nature of the crime reported. As one prominent
commentator has stated:
It must be recognized that stopping for investigation are not
all of one kind and that in some instances the need for
immediate action may be so great that substantial doubts
about the reliability of the informant or his information cannot
be permitted to stand in the way of prompt police action.
4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
9.4(h), at 229 (3d ed. 1996).
The most recent Utah case to speak about the circumstances under which an
informant is deemed reliable is State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In
this case, defendant had accompanied a female friend to the emergency room at the
University Hospital.

While there, two University Hospital security officers saw the
9

defendant getting vocal with an emergency room clerk. The officers also observed that
the defendant's eyes were glazed, his speech was slurred, he smelled strongly of
alcohol and was having trouble standing.

They concluded that defendant was

intoxicated.
When the officers asked the defendant to leave, he responded that he was going
to get a cup of coffee and then go home. Concerned that the defendant may attempt to
drive, one of the officers asked defendant's female friend as to where defendant's car
was parked. The officer then went to the hospital entrance where he saw defendant
trying to drive away in a red Pontiac Fiero.

The defendant repeatedly started the

vehicle, drove a few feet, stalled and then jerked to a stop. Seeing this, the officer
asked another hospital security officer to call the University of Utah police dispatch.
Upon receiving the call, university police dispatched two police officers to investigate
the report of an intoxicated male, driving a red Pontiac Fiero near the hospital entrance
and gave the license plate number.
Arriving at the hospital entrance, one of the officers, spotted a red Fiero with a
license plate number matching the description given by the dispatcher.

The officer

pulled behind the defendant and observed that he was having a hard time driving and
he was driving slow and jerky. Based primarily on the dispatch, as well as her own
observations, the officer stopped the defendant's car.

She subsequently arrested

defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the information from the
informant was not objectively reliable and therefore did not support the stop.
The court rejected defendant's argument and found the informant reliable and
"officer had reasonable suspicion to make the stop premised upon the security office
tip." Id. at 258. The court reached this conclusion because it found that the hospital
security office identified itself when it called, making it possible for the police to verify
the facts underlying the reports; the primary purpose of the security officers was to
10

protect its employees, patients and the general public; and the security officers
gathered the information in the course of their duties, which protected against any
speculative or unreliable reports.
Another Utah case dealing with the reliability of a tipster is State v. Grovier, 808
P.2d 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In Grovier, a confidential informant called a police
officer to tell them that there was methamphetamine in a car. The informant also gave
the officer the color and make of the car as well as the license plate number. The
officer relayed this information to his supervisor, who located the car, and then had one
of his other officers stop it.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the stop on the basis that the officer did not
have reasonable suspicion to stop him. The trial court denied the motion, concluding
that the officer's stop was based upon articulable and substantial facts that defendant
was committing a felony. The court found the informant reliable because the informant
was known to the officer; he had previously tipped the officer; he reported that he
observed methamphetamine in a certain make and color of car and described the
gender of the two occupants; he identified the license plate number; and he provided
the location where he had last seen the car.
On appeal, the court agreed with the trial court's decision, stating: "after
examining the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court's
determination of reasonable suspicion was not clearly erroneous." id. at 136.
While Grovier dealt with known police informants, unidentified citizen informants
who report their direct observations to police are also reliable. In Dionne v. State, 766
P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1989), an airport police officer was patrolling the parking lot of an
airport when a citizen informed her that the driver of a Ford station wagon, which was
located approximately ten feet away, was "possibly intoxicated."

The informant

indicated that he had reached this conclusion after observing the driver for "some time
now." When the officer approached the driver, she noticed that the headlights were not
11

on. While speaking to the driver, the driver's speech was slow and slurred. The driver
was subsequently arrested for driving while intoxicated.
The court concluded that the citizen informant was sufficiently credible because
the informant personally observed the defendant for "some time" immediately prior to
contacting the officer; and it was unlikely that the informant fabricated the statement,
information was stale or suspect no longer dangerous. Id. at 1183.
Likewise, the court in State v. Vannes, 781 P.2d 391 (Or. Ct. App. 1989), found
a citizen informant's tip sufficiently reliable to justify an officer's investigatory stop of an
intoxicated driver. In this case, a motorist approached an officer and told him that he
had just stopped the driver of a red Ford station wagon who had been driving
recklessly. The citizen told the officer that the driver appeared intoxicated and had
agreed to let the citizen drive him home, but that the citizen had to take his family home
first. The citizen asked the officer to watch the driver, who was parked right around the
corner to ensure that he stayed put. The officer did not obtain the name of the citizen
or the license plate number.
Minutes later, the officer saw the red Ford pulling out of the parking lot and
proceed toward the highway. He did not see any erratic driving, but immediately pulled
the driver over. The officer subsequently arrested the defendant for driving under the
influence.
In rejecting defendant's claim that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the
evidence of intoxication, the reviewing court concluded that the officer was justified in
relying upon citizen's tip for three reasons. First, the citizen had had personal contact
with the driver which allowed him to make first hand observations about the driver's
condition and to confirm the driver's intoxication. Second, the citizen was not seeking
an arrest. Third, the officer's was able to confirm through his own observations what
the citizen had reported to the extent that, when he drove around the corner, he saw
the red Ford leaving the parking lot.

The court reasoned that the officer could
12

reasonably have inferred that the citizen was simply a concerned witness who wanted
defendant to get home safely, and "that kind of informant was worthy of belief." Id. at
392.
Numerous other courts have reached the same conclusion about citizen
informants reporting criminal activity directly to the police. United States v. SierraHernandez, 581 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1978)(information from an unidentified citizen who
confronts officer to report that a designated individual present on the scene is
committing a specific crime is reliable); State v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357 (7th Cir.
1973)(informant deemed reliable because he was average citizen making observations
during work at gas station and stated he directly observed the facts); Johnson v. State,
439 A.2d 607 (Md. App. 1982)(unidentified ordinary citizen deemed reliable when
reporting direct observations); State v. Abadie, 390 So.2d 517 (La. 1980)(informer
reliable because he was an ordinary citizen who reported direct observations); People
v. Tooks, 271 N.W.2d 503 (Mich. 1978)(concern citizens entitled to finding of reliability
when they personally observe suspicious activities, information is sufficiently detailed
and corroborated within reasonable period of time by police).
Despite the overwhelming weight of authority supporting the trial court's finding
that Mr. Cassity was reliable, defendant argues that Mr. Cassity was an unreliable
informant and relies upon a single case: State v. Black, 721 P.2d 842 (Or. Ct. App.
1986).

However, Black is inopposite to this case.

First, and the most obvious

difference, is that this case does not involve an anonymous telephone call. Mr. Cassity
personally contacted Officer Schow on the street while trying to follow defendant. By
personally coming forward, Mr. Cassity made it possible for the police to verify his story
and exposed himself to possible criminal prosecution if his report was false. The caller
in Black did not do this.
Furthermore, Mr. Cassity personally observed defendant's criminal behavior for
some time before finding the police. In Black, it was not clear how the caller received
13

her information. In the instant case, there was no question: Mr. Cassity observed the
defendant for miles.
Moreover, Mr. Cassity gave the officer a wealth of information when compared to
the tipster in Black. Mr. Cassity told the officer he had observed defendant for some
time speeding and observed him go the wrong way on a one-way street almost causing
an accident. Mr. Cassity further gave the officer the make and color of the car and the
name of the defendant as well as the defendant's direction of travel. Officer Schow was
able to verify Mr. Cassity's information in that he found the defendant's car where Mr.
Cassity said it would be.
Defendant further claims that Mr. Cassity was unreliable because he gave a
false name and address. However, this single fact does not make him unreliable. In
Tooks, 271 N.W.2d at 506, the court held that when there is an ostensible reason for a
citizen informant refusing to identify himself, there is no inherent reliability.
Mr. Cassity testified that he did not want to identify himself because he feared
defendant might retaliate against him and his children, which was reasonable since
defendant was living with Mr. Cassity's children. His desire to remain anonymous under
these circumstances did not make him unreliable. Any claim of unreliability because of
a false name and address is buttressed by the fact that Mr. Cassity gave a correct
telephone number.
Even assuming defendant is correct on this one point, the totality of the other
circumstances support the fact that Mr. Cassity was a reliable informant. Like Dionne
and Vannes, this is a case about a crime in progress: a drunk driver who was an
immediate danger to himself and the public. The officers did not have the academic
luxury of quizzing Mr. Cassity about his reliability. Prompt police action was required to
avoid another traffic tragedy.
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Like Dionne and Vanness, this is also a case about an ordinary citizen coming
forward to fulfill his civic duty to report in detail his personal observations and why he
believed defendant was impaired. Mr. Cassity is the type of informant worthy of belief.
CONCLUSION
This court should affirm the circuit court's denial of defendant's motion to
suppress. Defendant has waived any claim that the state needed Officer Schow to
testify to establish the reasonable suspicion for stopping the defendant because he
agreed at the hearing that the officer was not need and failed to raise this issue during
his argument.
Even if defendant has preserve this issue, Officer Schow's testimony was not
needed. The facts Mr. Cassity relayed to Officer Schow about defendant's behavior
satisfies the objective fact test to justify a stop. Due to the closeness in time between
what Mr. Cassity told Officer Schow and the officer stopping defendant, the only
inference to be drawn is that the officer stopped defendant because of the information
Mr. Cassity gave him. Based upon Mr. Cassity's personal observations, reasonable
suspicion existed that defendant was driving impaired.
Furthermore, Mr. Cassity was a reliable witness under the totality of the
circumstances. He was simply a concerned citizen reporting a drunk driver. He was
able to observe defendant for some time and personally contacted Officer Schow to
obtain his help - exposing himself to criminal sanctions had his tip been false. He
provided the officer with the details of why he believed defendant was intoxicated from his speeding to driving the wrong way on a one-way street. Because defendant
represented a potential danger to the public, the officers had to act quickly. Thus,
under the circumstances, the officer was justified in stopping defendant.

15

Based upon the foregoing, the state requests this court to affirm the lower court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress.
DATED this 12th day of August, 1996.

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney

CYJi) CASTLE
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Appellee
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ADDENDUM A

76, Chapter 6, Part 8, Library Theft, is not criminally
or civilly liable where he has reasonable and probable
cause to believe that the person committed a theft of
library matenals
1967

(6) (a) Clerks and other administrative personnel
serving the district, circuit, juvenile, and justice
courts shall ensure that all citations for violation
of Title 41 are filed in a court with jurisdiction
and venue and shall refuse to receive citatiooi
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
that should be filed in another court.
question suspect — Grounds.
(b) Fines, fees, costs, and forfeitures impos%£
A p&2£& SS&I&T may sii>p BJ>y pBj$t>j> >J> B pxfbhc
or collected for violations of Title 41, which ar%
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe
filed contrary to this section shall be paid to the*
he has committed or is in the act of committing or iS
entitled municipality or county by the state!
attempting to commit a public offense and may decounty,
or municipal treasurer who has receive}
mand his name, address and an explanation of his
the fines, fees, costs, or forfeitures from the coujg
actions.
i98o
which collected them.
(c) The accounting and remitting of sums <
77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk susshall be at the close of the fiscal year of the i
pect for dangerous weapon
nicipality or county which has received
Grounds.
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarfees, costs, or forfeitures as a result of any in
lly for questioning may frisk the person for a dangerproperly filed citations.
ous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other
person is in danger
i960 77-7-20. Service of citation on defendant — ]
ing in court — Contents of citation
77-7-17. Authority of peace officer to take pos(1) If a citation is issued pursuant to
session of weapons.
77-7-18, the peace officer or public official shall is
A peace officer who finds a dangerous weapon pur- one copy to the person cited and shall withinfivec
suant to a frisk may take and keep it until the Com- file a duplicate copy with the court specified in i
pletion of the questioning, at which time he shall ei- citation.
ther return it if lawfully possessed, or arrest Such
(2) Each copy of the citation issued under auti
person.
i^o of this chapter shall contain:
(a) The name of the court before which the j
77-7-18. Citation on misdemeanor or infraction
son is to appear;
charge.
(b) The name of the person cited;
A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person into cus(c) A brief description of the offense charge^
tody, any public official of any county or municipality
(d) The date, time and place at which theji
charged with the enforcement of the faw, a port-offense is alleged to have occurred;
entry agent as defined in Section 27-12-2, and a vol(e) The date on which the citation was 1
unteer authorized to issue a citation under Section
41-la-414 may issue and deliver a citation requi^ng
(f) The name of the peace officer or public c
any person subject to arrest or prosecution on a ihiS.
cial who issued the citation, and the name <
demeanor or infraction charge to appear at the c^urt
arresting person if an arrest was made by a ]
of the magistrate before whom the person should be
vate party and the citation was issued in lie
taken pursuant to law if the person had been artaking the arrested person before a mag
rested.
1994
(g) The time and date on or before and <
which the person is to appear;
77-7-19. Appearance required by citation — Ar(h) The address of the court in which the'i
rest for failure to appear — Transfer of
son is to appear,
cases — Motor vehicle violations
(i) A certification above the signature of B
Disposition of fines and costs.
officer issuing the citation in substantially jS
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations s^all
following language: 'T certify that a copy of t^
appear before the magistrate designated in the citacitation or information (Summons and
tion on or before the time and date specified in the
plaint) was duly served upon the defendant
citation unless the uniform bail schedule adoptee) by
cording to law on the above date and I;
the Judicial Council or Subsection 77-7-21(1) per^uts
believe and so allege that the above-named dj
forfeiture of bail for the offense charged.
fendant did commit the offense herein set 1
(2) A citation may not require a person to appear
contrary to law. I further certify that the con
sooner than five days or later than 14 days following
which the defendant has been directed to ap
its issuance.
is the proper court pursuant to Section 77-7-5
(3) A person who receives a citation and who f^is
and
to comply with Section 77-7-21 on or before the t* me
and date and at the court specified is subject to arrest.
(j) A notice containing substantially the J
lowing language:
(4) Except where otherwise provided by law, a citaREAD CAREFULLY
tion or information issued for violations of Title 41
shall state that the person receiving the citation 0 r
This citation is not an information and will not*
information shall appear before the magistrate tyho
used as an information without your consent,
has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
(5) Any justice court judge may, upon the motion 0 f information is filed you will be provided a copy by J9]
either the defense attorney or prosecuting attorney, court. You MUST appear in court on or before f
based on a lack of territorial jurisdiction or the qiS- time set in this citation. IF YOU FAIL TO APPE
quahfication of the judge, transfer cases to the near- AN INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND
est justice court or the nearest circuit court witlun COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOURi
the county
REST.
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